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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the final order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union. (Order 3). The
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim based
on federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
Specifically, standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and Code of Federal Regulations are all
matters of federal question at issue on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Friends of Responsible Trade now timely appeals the district
court’s final order granting Green Recycling Group and Newtown
Parent Teachers Association’s motion for summary judgment.
(Order 4). This court has jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2006), which grants jurisdiction over all final decisions of the
lower courts.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether FRT has sufficient constitutional or statutory
standing to bring this claim against GRG and Newtown
PTA for violating RCRA.
II. Whether ATCA provides an alternate basis for FRT’s
standing in this claim.
III. Whether the lower court’s dismissal of FRT’s claim bars
the EPA, as intervenor, from continuing litigation.
IV. Whether the lower court properly analyzed the nature of
container #VS2078 as solid waste, and whether its
export subjects GRG and Newtown PTA to liability
under RCRA.
V. Whether container #VS2078 is hazardous waste for the
purposes of RCRA.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union. Order Granting Mot.
Summ. J. (Aug. 31, 2009).
Friends of Responsible Trade
(hereinafter “FRT”) instituted an action against Green Recycling
Group, Inc. (hereinafter “GRG”) and Newtown Parent Teachers
Association, Inc. (hereinafter “Newtown PTA”) for violation of the
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901
(2006). (hereinafter “RCRA”) seeking civil penalties, injunctive
relief, and compensatory damages. (Order 3). Specifically, FRT
argued that GRG and Newtown PTA violated RCRA when they
exported used electronic devices (hereinafter “UEDs”) abroad for
salvage and recycling without complying with the specific federal
requirements pertaining to the disposal of hazardous waste.
(Order 3).
FRT asserts representational standing through
members, Ace Ventura (hereinafter “Ventura”), Juan Valdez
(hereinafter “Valdez”), or both, pursuant to Article III of the
United States Constitution and RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2006). (Order 3). Alternatively, FRT
asserts appropriate federal jurisdiction through Valdez pursuant
to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (hereinafter
“ATCA”). (Order 3). The Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter “EPA”) later intervened pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§6972(d). (Order 3). FRT, joined by the EPA, filed a motion for
partial summary judgment against GRG and Newtown PTA for
their violation of RCRA, leaving the remedial portion of the
action, whether the matter shipped was actually hazardous, to be
determined at trial. (Order 3). GRG and Newtown PTA filed a
countermotion for summary judgment claiming two alternative
arguments: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
action brought by FRT, thus precluding the EPA’s ability to
continue its litigation; or (2) that GRG and Newtown PTA did not
violate RCRA. (Order 4).
The district court granted GRG and Newtown PTA’s motion
for summary judgment, finding that FRT lacked constitutional
standing. (Order 4). In addition, the court narrowly interpreted
RCRA, finding that an ongoing environmental violation is a
condition precedent to bringing suit, and GRG and Newtown
PTA’s actions were only in the past. (Order 4). The district court
also dismissed Valdez’s ATCA claim, finding that the actions of
GRG and Newtown PTA did not violate a recognized law of
nations. (Order 4).
Although the district court properly
recognized the EPA’s right to intervene and continue litigation for
the purpose of enforcing RCRA, it ultimately dismissed the entire
claim, finding the waste collected was household in nature and
thus exempt from hazardous classification under RCRA. (Order
4). As a result of these decisions, FRT requests review.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
FRT is an international non-profit membership organization
that advocates for responsible trade practices on behalf of its
members. (Order Attach). Ventura and Valdez are both members
of FRT. (Order 4).
Ventura is an American citizen and
accomplished photojournalist, who recently released, “Toxic
Recycling,” a documentary about the shipment of UEDs from the
United States to unregulated salvage facilities abroad. (Order 4,
6). “Toxic Recycling” has aired on public television and been
awarded as the best documentary film at three film festivals.
(Order 6). Valdez, a citizen of Sud-Americano, works at the local
salvage and reclamation facility featured in Ventura’s
documentary. (Order 5-6).
GRG accumulates UEDs, such as cell phones, televisions, and
computers, for sale and exportation to foreign salvagers. (Order
4). Pursuant to this purpose, GRG enters into partnerships with
community organizations to collect UEDs. (Order 4). The town of
Newtown, State of New Union, home to the MyPhone corporate
headquarters, was chosen as a test site for the “Myphone,” a
device similar to Apple’s iPhone. (Order 5). Unlike the iPhone,
the “Myphone’s” battery contains mercury, lithium, and other
toxic materials, including lead. (Order 5). The “Myphone” could
not adequately make phone calls, lost its market share with its
competitors, and eventually became obsolete. (Order 5). After the
failure of the “Myphone,” most citizens of Newtown were
burdened with a heavy, useless device. (Order 5).
GRG partnered with Newtown PTA to develop a recycling
program to collect the dysfunctional “Myphones” and other UEDs.
(Order 4-5). Newtown PTA solicited residents for UEDs, to be
used in developing countries either in their original capacity or
recycled for parts. (Order 5). GRG required residents to sign a
form acknowledging that all collected devices were used within
their household and that all contributed items were intact. (Order
5). GRG supplied the container, identified as #VS2078, and
Newtown PTA supervised the collection of all the materials on
June 19, 2008. (Order 5). Ventura was at Newtown High School
on the day of collection and photographed Newtown PTA
members packing the donated UEDs into container #VS2078.
(Order 5). Thereafter, GRG shipped this container to Geraldo
Garcia’s (hereinafter “Garcia”) salvage and reclamation facility in
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Pacifica, Sud-Americano with no paperwork, aside from custom
documents. (Order 5). In pursuit of his investigation, Ventura
traveled to Garcia’s site and filmed his employees. (Order 6).
Garcia sorts UEDs and their components, typically salvaging
about half the material for reuse in the Pacifica market. (Order
5). At his facility, Garcia’s employees go through the UEDs,
including those in container #VS2078, reclaiming metals and
other valuable materials. (Order 5). Valdez has worked for
Garcia since the inception of Garcia’s salvage and recycling
business six years ago. (Order 6). As a result of operating in a
country with no regulatory recycling scheme, Valdez and other
employees at Garcia’s facility were exposed to mercury, lead, and
other heavy metals. (Order 6). Ventura’s documentary following
container #VS2078 highlights Valdez and his fellow workers’
exposure to these hazardous materials. (Order 6). Additionally,
the release of the toxins, including those known to be present in
container #VS2078, caused contamination to the water and the
local environment, exposing all residents and visitors (including
Ventura) to injurious materials. (Order 6).
Specifically, Valdez now suffers from memory and
neurological losses. (Order 6).
Expert medical testimony
established that Valdez’s injuries are “of the type caused by lead
and mercury poisoning.” (Order 6).
The extent to which
Ventura’s exposure physically harmed him is unknown at this
premature stage. (Order 6-7). However, because of his exposure
to the contaminated water and environment while filming “Toxic
Recycling,” Ventura is fearful of returning to Pacifica and risking
further exposure. (Order 7). Because of its interest in responsible
international trade, FRT brings this action in conjunction with its
members, Ventura and Valdez, to redress the injuries suffered as
a result of GRG and Newtown PTA’s unregulated export of UEDs
known to contain mercury, lead, and other toxic materials. (Order
3).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
FRT satisfies the requirements of Article III standing
through its injured members, Ventura and Valdez. Only one
member of FRT need establish constitutional standing to bring
this action in federal court. Furthermore, GRG and Newtown
PTA’s illegal exportation of hazardous waste to Pacifica caused
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Ventura and Valdez’s injuries. These injuries will be deterred,
and thus redressed, through civil penalties, injunctive relief, and
punitive damages against GRG and Newtown PTA. An injury
which satisfies the Article III burden may exist by virtue of
federal statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing. RCRA creates such a right for FRT and its
members. GRG and Newtown PTA violated this right when they
illegally shipped hazardous waste to the unregulated country of
Sud-Americano without receiving the country’s consent, as
required by RCRA.
Even if this court determined that FRT did not qualify for
standing under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, GRG and Newtown
PTA’s tortious acts also violated international norms which
qualify for recognition under the law of nations. As such, the
ATCA is an alternate basis for standing for FRT. The shipment
of hazardous waste to unregulated, non-OECD countries has been
banned by the majority of the world’s civilized nations. By
ignoring this customary rule, GRG and Newtown PTA injured the
Pacifica community, including Valdez.
Should this court find that FRT cannot establish standing,
and thus dismiss their claim, as the administrator agency, the
EPA has the right to intervene in this action and has sufficient
standing to recommence the proceeding independently.
However, FRT can establish appropriate jurisdiction under
RCRA because the material in container #VS2078 was both solid
and hazardous, two requisite requirements. Specifically, when
the UEDs were individually disposed of, accumulated, and
recycled through reclamation they were solid waste for the
purposes of RCRA. Furthermore, RCRA is not violated until the
solid, hazardous material is shipped abroad to unconsenting
countries; thus, Congress intended to apply RCRA to violations
committed abroad. The EPA properly treats organizations like
GRG and Newtown PTA as generators under RCRA, thus making
them responsible under the Code of Federal Regulations to
determine whether the material they ship is hazardous. (The
material in container #VS2078 is characteristically hazardous.)
However, GRG and Newtown PTA failed to meet RCRA’s
requirements. The household exemption, which would alleviate
GRG and Newtown PTA from liability is not applicable here
because it was not generated on the premises of a residence, was
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not the type of waste generated by consumers in their home, and
household and nonhousehold items were mixed together.
Therefore, GRG and Newtown PTA are liable for the injuries
caused by the illegal disposal of hazardous waste.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a lower court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, a standard of review in which no form of
appellate deference is acceptable. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991). During a de novo review, the appellate
court will use the same legal standard used by the district court;
specifically, “summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.” Universal Money Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “While the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the moving party. . . need only
point out. . .that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Moreover, “[w]hen applying this
standard, [the appellate courts] examine the factual record and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). “As with all summary judgment
determinations, [the court] reviews the matter de novo to decide
whether the record as a whole establishes that the defendant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Chi. v. Envt’l
Def. Fund, 948 F.2d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1991).
ARGUMENT
I.

FRT HAS STANDING IN FEDERAL COURT TO
BRING ACTION AGAINST GRG AND NEWTOWN
PTA FOR RCRA VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM
THE EXPORTATION OF CONTAINER #VS2078 TO
SUD-AMERICANO.

To establish standing as an organization under Article III of
the United States Constitution (hereinafter “Article III”), FRT
must show that one of its members has standing to bring this
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action. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 878 F.Supp 1295 (D.S.D.
1993). Both Valdez and Ventura are members of FRT and base
standing on the environmental degradation and pollution
resulting from GRG and Newtown PTA’s exportation of
hazardous waste to Pacifica. (Order 6). An individual achieves
standing by demonstrating: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) a causal
connection between that injury and the complained of behavior;
and (3) the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by the suit.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). The
injury requirement under Article III may exist by virtue of
federal statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). In
this case, the injury occurred when GRG and Newtown PTA
invaded a legal right by violating RCRA. Furthermore, the illegal
exportation of hazardous waste to Pacifica by GRG and Newtown
PTA, via container #VS2078, demonstrates a causal connection to
the physical, as well as environmental injury in this case. This
type of gross disregard for the law will be deterred in the future
by redressing the injuries of Valdez and Ventura through civil
penalties and injunctive relief, thus establishing the
redressibility element for standing required by jurisprudence.
Finally, both Valdez and Ventura have a valid cause of action
based on GRG and Newtown PTA’s violation of RCRA. In 1984
Congress amended RCRA to implement international regulations
on the exportation of hazardous waste, like UEDs; the
amendment is referred to as the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendment (hereinafter “HSWA”). 42 U.S.C. § 6398 (2006); 40
C.F.R. § 262.53(a)(i)-(vii) (2009). HSWA requires exporters to
obtain express consent from recipient countries before sending
hazardous materials abroad for recycling. Id. The lower court
should have adopted the United States Supreme Court’s opinion
in Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc.,
finding that citizen suits can be brought for past acts when they
are likely to reoccur in the future. Friends of Earth, 528 U.S. 167
(2000). Therefore, FRT has Article III standing, and can also
establish a cause of action based under RCRA.
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FRT satisfies the requisite elements of Article III
standing through its members, Ventura and Valdez.

The lower court should have found that FRT has
representational standing through either member, Ventura or
Valdez. In U.S. Forest Serv. the United States Supreme Court
held, “if there is no direct injury to an association itself, an
association may establish standing as a representative of its
members.” 878 F. Supp. 1295 at 1302. The “constitutional
minimum of standing” consists of three elements. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. First, the injury-in-fact suffered by the
plaintiff must be (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent. Id. Second, the causal connection between the injury
and the injury causing conduct must be fairly traceable to the
defendant’s action and not severed by the independent action of
some third party. Id. at 560-61 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)). Third, it must be likely, rather
than speculative, that the plaintiff’s injury will be redressed with
a favorable decision. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.
Ventura and Valdez meet all three requisite elements; thus, FRT
can properly establish standing in federal court.
1. Ventura and Valdez suffered injury-in-fact.
Ventura and Valdez suffered injuries that satisfy FRT’s
burden of proving injury-in-fact. In Defenders of Wildlife, the
Supreme Court determined injury-in-fact to be an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized as
well as actual or imminent. Id. at 560. Furthermore, the Court
held, “by particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way. . . .” Id. at 561 n.1. In
Laidlaw, the Court found standing based on plaintiff’s inability to
use public grounds for recreational purposes, such as hiking and
fishing. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183. Additionally, the Court has
also held that plaintiff must show “specific, concrete facts” to
prove actual harm. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508. In determining the
injury-in-fact, the Supreme Court distinguishes imminent injury
from actual injury in that an imminent injury is impending.
Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
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Valdez suffers from both actual and imminent particular
injuries caused by the hazardous materials found in “MyPhones.”
Footage obtained by Ventura reveals that container #VS2078 was
entirely filled with material collected from Newtown PTA. (Order
5). Most of the material in the container consisted of “MyPhones”
(Order 5). “MyPhones” use mercury lithium batteries and other
toxic materials including lead. (Order 5). Ventura’s footage also
ascertained that Garcia employed Valdez and other local laborers
to reclaim these heavy metals and other valuable materials from
container #VS2078, thus exposing Valdez to mercury, lead, and
other toxic substances. (Order 5-6). Valdez currently suffers from
actual injuries, including memory and neurological losses of the
type caused by lead and mercury poisoning. (Order 6). He also
faces imminent harm through his particular connection to the
affected area. Valdez will be injured by corruption to the
environment where he lives, raises a family, and works. As such,
GRG and Newtown PTA’s actions present a threat of imminent
future injury. Finally, the lower court found that “there is no
doubt that Valdez is suffering injuries.” (Order 6).
FRT member Ventura also suffered imminent particular
injury from GRG and Newtown PTA’s illegal exportation of
hazardous waste to Pacifica, and this harm is analogous to the
kind of harm the Supreme Court has found to establish standing.
Specifically, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court
declared that even harm to “aesthetic value and environmental
well-being” may contribute to establishing injury-in-fact. Morton,
405 U.S., 727, 734-35 (1972). The lower court should have found
that Ventura did not have to allege physical injuries to establish
injury-in-fact. However, the waste from the UEDs in container
#VS2078 caused mercury, lead, and other heavy metals to enter
into the water and land of Pacifica, endangering everyone in the
community, including Ventura. (Order 6). Also, Ventura has
expressed his severe distress over the harm to the environmental
and aesthetic well-being of Pacifica, an area to which he is
particularly connected to by his work. (Order 7). Because of the
public interest that has arisen since the release of his
documentary, Ventura would likely want to return to Pacifica,
but is too fearful of further exposure to hazardous material.
(Order 6, 7). Similar to the prevention of recreational activities
found to establish standing in Laidlaw, Ventura also has a
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particularized interest in the city of Pacifica. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at
183. Therefore, Ventura’s particularized interest in Pacifica is
sufficient to establish imminent injury-in-fact.
2. GRG and Newtown PTA’s shipment of container
#VS2078 caused Ventura and Valdez’s injuries.
GRG and Newtown PTA’s shipment of container #VS2078 to
Pacifica was the only cause of injuries to Valdez, Ventura, and
the city of Pacifica. Under Article III, the injury suffered must be
“fairly traceable” to the actions at issue, and not the result of an
independent action of a third party absent from the proceeding.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41-42). Moreover, “to show that
the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, the
plaintiff(s) must make a reasonable showing that but for the
defendant’s action the alleged injury would not occur.” Forest
Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Servs., 338 F.
Supp. 2d 1135, 1143 (D. Mont. 2004) (emphasis added).
Ventura’s documentary traces the illegal shipment directly
from Newtown to Garcia’s salvage facility in Pacifica. (Order 5).
GRG supplied container #VS2078 and Newtown PTA members
supervised the collection of the UEDs, a significant number of
which were “MyPhones”. (Order 5). Ventura photographed many
of the UEDs that Newtown PTA’s members placed in the
container. (Order 5). Subsequently, GRG and Newton PTA
exported container #VS2078 to Pacifica where Ventura and
Valdez were directly exposed to material reclaimed from the
“MyPhones.” (Order 5-6). Medical testimony established that
Valdez suffers memory and neurological losses linked to lead and
mercury poisoning, agents known to be present in the “MyPhone”.
(Order 5).
Therefore, because the chemicals causing the
members’ injuries are found in the “MyPhones” handled by
Valdez, and videoed by Ventura, a causal link is necessarily
established.
In addition, because the broad scope of
environmental claims allows for injuries to the aesthetic value of
the environment in which Ventura and Valdez have an interest,
and because Pacifica suffered contamination to the water and
land from these hazardous materials, GRG and Newtown PTA’s
exportation of container #VS2078 to Pacifica, is fairly traceable to

11

APPELLANTS_FINAL

948

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Valdez’s direct medical injuries, Ventura’s imminent injuries, and
to the injuries Pacifica suffered as a whole.
The lower court erroneously found if any causal connection
exists, it would be a result of Garcia, an absent third party to the
suit, because he “failed to properly conduct his recycling
operations.” (Order 7). However, the negligent acts of Garcia do
not sever the causal link between GRG and Newtown PTA’s
illegal shipment of hazardous materials and Ventura and
Valdez’s injuries. Congress amended RCRA to protect persons in
unregulated countries from the mismanagement of recycling
facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6398 (2006). Garcia’s facility is located in
Pacifica, where there is no regulated recycling regime. (Order 5).
Without being notified of the hazardous nature of the container’s
materials pursuant to RCRA’s requirement, Garcia had no way to
protect his employees. Garcia’s actions are at best contributory,
but in no way superseding to the illegal acts of GRG and
Newtown PTA. Therefore, but for the violation of RCRA, the
injuries to Ventura and Valdez would not have resulted.
3. Ventura and Valdez’s injuries would likely be
redressed through a favorable verdict for FRT.
Ventura and Valdez’s injuries can be redressed through
injunctive relief and civil penalties because GRG, and similar
companies, will be deterred from committing similar offenses in
the future.
In addition, Newtown PTA, and similar
organizations, would be deterred from making partnerships with
recycling groups without ensuring compliance with all federal
exportation requirements under RCRA. In Doyle v. Town of
Litchfield, the plaintiff alleged that the town violated RCRA and
other state laws. Doyle, 372 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D. Conn. 2005).
The Doyle plaintiff owned property approximately a quarter mile
from the town’s municipal landfill, which he claimed
contaminated his property. Id. However, the Court in Doyle
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding the
plaintiff was unable to establish standing because he no longer
owned the property, and therefore, had no legal interest in the
case. Doyle, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 302. Accordingly, the Court held
that a favorable verdict would not redress the plaintiff’s injuries.
Id.
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Unlike Doyle, Ventura and Valdez have an interest in their
health and Pacifica, where they live and work, respectively. An
injunction to stop the pollution, civil penalties to deter further
pollution, or both, would deter GRG and companies with whom it
forms partnerships (such as Newtown PTA) from committing
similar harmful acts. When FRT filed its complaint, GRG
possessed, and continues to possess, an open-ended contract with
Garcia for future shipments to Pacifica. (Order 8). Therefore,
injunctive relief would redress Ventura and Valdez’s injuries
because the cessation of future shipments of hazardous material
to Pacifica would prevent further harm to their health and
professions. Hence, unlike the plaintiff in Doyle, Ventura and
Valdez have injuries which can be redressed by a favorable
decision.
B.

FRT has standing to bring a “citizen suit,” against
GRG and Newtown PTA for their violation of RCRA.

Even though RCRA is usually enforced by the federal
government, it contains a citizen suit provision that gives
individuals the ability to enforce provisions of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §
6972 (2006). Violations of this statute would typically afford a
plaintiff standing; however, in this case the lower court
incorrectly found three reasons why FRT lacked standing. First,
the court held RCRA requires an ongoing violation and no
continuous violation was occurring. (Order 8). Second, because
Valdez was not a citizen of the United States he could not allege
jurisdiction under RCRA. (Order 7). Finally, the harms suffered
by Ventura and Valdez were not caused by a violation of RCRA,
but rather by the negligent actions of Garcia. (Order 7).
However, RCRA creates a legal right to be free from harm
from hazardous waste exportation. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
Additionally, actionable claims for RCRA violations should not be
based on a solely past act standard, but instead, should consider
whether the wrongful action is likely to occur again in the future.
The lower court should have adopted the Supreme Court’s
position in Laidlaw, which allows a citizen suit to be brought for
past acts when those acts were likely to recur. See Laidlaw, 528
U.S. 167. Furthermore, FRT asserts standing through the
violation of RCRA under Ventura only, and only one member of
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an organization is required to establish standing. Finally, the
lower court should have found the injuries suffered were a result
of GRG violating RCRA, because RCRA specifically requires that
exporters notify recipient countries when they are shipping
hazardous materials abroad, and it failed to do so.
1. RCRA, as amended by HWSA, creates a legal right for
all persons to be free from the harmful effects of
hazardous waste exportation.
By passing HSWA in 1984, Congress extended the scope of
RCRA to provide international regulations on the exportation of
hazardous waste. William Schneider, The Basel Convention Ban

on Hazardous Waste Exports: Paradigm of Efficacy or Exercise in
Futility, 20 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 247 (1996). As amended,
RCRA requires all United States exporters to notify the EPA and
obtain consent of the recipient country prior to exporting
hazardous materials abroad. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006); 40 C.F.R. §
262.53 (2009).
A manifest copy of the recipient country’s
acceptance must be attached to each shipment. Id. The recipient
country sets the terms and conditions on which its consent
depends, unless such terms are already established by a treaty
between the countries. Id. HSWA required GRG to ascertain
manifest acceptance from the Sud-Americano government and
conform to any conditions Pacifica required. GRG did not provide
any paperwork, aside from customs documents, when it shipped
container #VS2078 to Pacifica. (Order 5). Thus, GRG and
Newtown PTA violated RCRA, infringing on the legal rights of
Ventura and Valdez – as well as all citizens of Pacifica.
2. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “purely past
act” language of the Clean Water Act also applies to
RCRA’s citizen suit provision.
The lower court narrowly interpreted RCRA’s citizen suit
provision, finding the actions of GRG and Newtown were solely in
the past. (Order 8). RCRA’s citizen suit provision states: “any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf—against
any person. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
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order. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006) (emphasis added). The lower
court found that because the shipment by GRG and Newtown
PTA had already occurred, they were no longer in violation of a
RCRA provision.
Recently, the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Water
Act’s citizen suit provision in Laidlaw, specifically in regard to the
purely past act language. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167. Because
RCRA’s citizen suit provision contains the same language, the
Laidlaw holding should be adopted here. The respondent in
Laidlaw bought a hazardous waste incinerator facility and
subsequently discharged treated water in the North Tyger River.
Id. at 176. The respondent’s discharges repeatedly violated the
Clean Water Act by exceeding the limits set out in its permit. Id.
Pursuant to the citizen suit requirement of the Clean Water Act,
petitioner notified respondent of its intent to file suit. Id. To
avoid petitioner’s suit, respondent solicited the appropriate
regulatory agency to sue them first and reached a settlement one
day before the petitioner legally filed suit in district court, and
then argued that the petitioner’s claim was moot. Id. at 176-67.
The majority specifically noted:
The standard we have announced for determining whether a case
has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct is
stringent: “a case might become moot if subsequent events made
it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to occur.” The “heavy burden of
persuading” the court that the challenged conduct cannot
reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party
asserting mootness.

Id. at 189.

The Court ultimately concluded that because the
respondent continued to possess a permit, it did not meet its
heavy burden of establishing the claim moot. The Court refused
to dismiss the case based on respondent’s voluntary changes in
behavior. Id. at 193-194.
It is well settled that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Furthermore,
the defendant has the burden to prove mootness by persuading
the court that the conduct in question cannot reasonably be
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expected to recur. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189. GRG’s open-ended
contract with Garcia is analogous to Laidlaw’s retention of a
NPDES permit. Subsequent to the exportation of container
#VS2078, it is not reasonably clear that GRG will stop exporting
hazardous materials abroad. Therefore, GRG has failed to
establish that the RCRA violation was a purely past act.
Moreover, the lower court held that Valdez could not
establish jurisdiction under RCRA because he was not a citizen of
the United States; however, no provision under HSWA or RCRA
specifically bars aliens from bringing a citizen suit against
violators. Under the analogous citizen suit provision of the Clean
Water Act, Congress defines a citizen as, “a person having
interest which is, or may be, adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a), (g) (2006). Therefore, because Valdez is adversely
affected by GRG’s unregulated exportation of hazardous
materials to his country, he is eligible to bring suit under the
citizen suit provision. However, even if this court chooses not to
recognize Valdez’s interest in enforcing unregulated exportation
of hazardous materials into his home country, Ventura’s standing
under RCRA is still valid.
FRT can establish representational standing through either
of its members, Valdez or Ventura. Both members suffered
concrete and particular, as well as, actual and imminent injuries.
The lower court recognized Valdez suffered physical harm, but
should have recognized Ventura’s injuries were directly related to
his interests in the city of Pacifica. Furthermore, those injuries
are a direct result of GRG and Newtown PTA’s shipment of
container #VS2078. The container’s contents were known to
cause the exact injuries of which FRT complains. By granting
injunctive relief, civil penalties, or both, this court will deter
GRG, Newtown PTA, and any similar partnerships, from
continuing to ignore the federal regulations regarding the export
of hazardous waste abroad. Finally, FRT has standing to bring a
citizen suit based on GRG and Newtown PTA’s violation of RCRA.
Because GRG and Newtown PTA’s behavior is likely to occur
again in the future, the lower court should have found that there
was jurisdiction for FRT’s claim under RCRA. Further, at the
very least there is a dispute of fact, which warrants reversal of
summary judgment.
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II. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (ATCA) PROVIDES
FRT WITH AN ALTERNATE BASIS FOR
JURISDICTION.
Should this court find that RCRA does not provide
jurisdiction, FRT can still bring a claim through Valdez under the
ATCA. The ATCA allows aliens to pursue civil actions in federal
courts “for tort only,” and only if the tort was “committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). A violation of the law of nations is a
violation of those standards by which nations regulate their
dealings with one another. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 714 (2004). International treaties can evidence customary
norms under the law of nations. Id. at 734; Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2008). As times have changed
and as new issues arise, courts have recognized the need to
extend ATCA beyond its original purpose. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). However, even with these
adaptations, the ATCA only creates jurisdiction for a narrow
range of torts. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. As a result, it is appropriate
to analogize the exportation of hazardous waste to piracy, which
has long been recognized as a law of nations. Id. at 725.
Accordingly, the lower court improperly found there is nothing
well-defined about regulations on the exportation of hazardous
waste.
A.

GRG and Newtown PTA violated norms established by
international treaties.

The district court should have found that the ATCA does
provide jurisdiction for Valdez’s tort claim. The ATCA grants
federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil actions brought by aliens
“for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). For an
action to be maintained under the ATCA’s “law of nations”
provision, the tort must violate a norm of customary international
law. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). Valdez
suffered personal injuries when GRG and Newtown PTA
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deliberately disposed of hazardous waste in contravention of
customary international law.
The law of nations is created from the general customs and
practices of nations, and is not static but ever-evolving with the
changing times. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and
Values 29 (M. Nijhoff ed., Dordrecht 1995) (1995). As the lower
court held, torts giving rise to the ATCA jurisdiction are few and
far between. (Order 9). However, this should not prevent the
judiciary from recognizing the development of international
norms, which are created to resolve global problems. Fearing
adverse effects on foreign policy, the Supreme Court has
continually looked to Congress for guidance as to what modern
torts should be recognized as actionable under the law of nations.
H.R.Rep. No. 102-367, pt.1, (1991). Since the ATCA’s creation in
th
the 18 century, courts have adapted the law of nations to include
torture and other acts in violation of human rights. Filartiga, 630
F.2d 876; Tel-Orren v. Libyan, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (2d Cir 1984).
Prior to1989, there existed global concern for the overall
increase in the generation and exportation of hazardous waste to
countries, where significant health and environmental problems
were rising as a result. William Schneider, The Basel Convention

Ban on Hazardous Waste Exports: Paradigm of Efficiancy or
Exercise in Futility, 20 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 247, 251 (1996).
The Basel Convention represents the efforts of 121 countries,
OECD nations and non-OECD nations, government organizations
and non-government organizations, coming together to address
the risks of transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Id. at
252. Health and environmental risks to the recipient countries
were determined to be far more significant than the profits
recycling companies were making by shipping abroad, and thus a
ban was created prohibiting the unregulated exportation of
hazardous waste. Id. at 278. Therefore, because the Basel
Convention has been embraced by over 60% of the civilized world,
its ban on the exportation of unregulated hazardous waste should
be recognized as a law of nations.
Although the Basel Convention covered the exact “activities
at issue here,” the lower court was hesitant to rely on the Basel
Convention as a resource of an international norm because the
United States never ratified it. (Order 9). However, in 2008, the
Ninth Circuit applied concepts expressed in the United Nations
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Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) as a source of
establishing new components of the law of nations. Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2008). Like the Basel
Convention, the United States has yet to ratify UNCLOS,
evidencing that federal courts may turn to unratified treaties to
establish modern day international norms. Thus, the Basel
Convention’s ban prohibiting the exportation of hazardous waste
should similarly be adopted here because it establishes an
international norm recognized under the law of nations.
In addition, the lower court failed to note that regional
treaties have recently adopted the Basel Convention’s ban of the
exportation of unregulated hazardous material. Lome
Convention, Dec. 15, 2009, 29 I.L.M. 809 (1990); Bamako
Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa of
Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous
Waste in Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991). Because the
exportation of hazardous waste is such a significant problem and
such a large amount of the world supports its regulation, the
illegal exportation of hazardous waste should be actionable as a
violation of the law of nations. Therefore, this court should find
that the ATCA provides jurisdiction for Valdez’s personal injury
claim arising from GRG and Newtown PTA’s tortious conduct.
In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the court held
exportation of dangerous pollutants would not constitute the
requisite violation of international law. It is important to note,
however, that this case did not take into consideration the Basel
Convention’s amendment which officially banned the exportation
of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries. Amlon, 775 F.Supp.
Exporting hazardous waste to
668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
unregulated countries should be recognized as a violation of law
of nations because of its expressed provision in the Basel
Convention and the OECD decision on hazardous waste.
B. The exportation of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries
without their consent is comparable to piracy, and thus
violates the law of nations.
The treaties created as a result of the Basel Convention and
the OECD Convention represent the law of nations regarding the
export of hazardous waste. See Bamko Convention, Jan 30, 1991,
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30 I.L.M.773 (1991); Lome Convention, Dec. 15 1989, 29 I.L.M.
809 (1990). The ATCA only creates jurisdiction for a narrow
range of torts, only those which violate international law “as
widely defined” today as piracy was in 1789. (Order 9). When
created in 1789, few tortious actions were recognized as a law of
nations, including infringements of the rights of ambassadors and
violation of safe conducts, but most notably, piracy. Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 at 725. Since then, courts have recognized the need to
adapt to changes in time and expand the types of actionable torts
under the ATCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Restatement (Third),
Foreign Relations § 702 (1987). Added to the list over the past
two centuries have been torture, slavery, and extrajudicial
killing. Id. The Court in Sosa recognized that the ATCA should
extend beyond piracy; however, held that a strict standard of the
statute’s limitations should be maintained. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692,
729. The lower court improperly found that there is nothing welldefined about regulations dealing with the exportation of
hazardous waste, and thus this court should reverse.
The qualifying factor of all legitimate ATCA causes of action
is hostis humanani generic, “an enemy of all mankind.” Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 210, 239 (1844). In 1844, Justice Story
proclaimed why piracy is proscribed by the law of nations. He
explained:
A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humanani
generis. But why is he so deemed? Because he commits
hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations,
without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public
authority.

Id. Corporations, such as GRG and Newtown PTA, who violate
national laws and international norms to risk sickness, death,
and mass environmental corruption, in hopes to plunder a profit
by exploiting developing nations, are toxic pirates.
Their
recklessness makes them an enemy of all mankind, and the
severity of the potential risks to be protected demands that this
court recognize toxic recycling as a violation of the law of nations.
Furthermore, the exportation of hazardous waste has become
as widely defined today as piracy was in 1789. The Basel
Convention brought the majority of the world’s countries together
to address the problem. In addition, Congress amended RCRA to
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include a specific provision on the exportation of hazardous waste
to unregulated countries.
Therefore, because hazardous
exporting has become a global concern and because it commits
hostilities upon recipients without any regard for their citizens’
health or well-being, it is comparable to piracy in 1789, and thus
the lower court should have found their actions to be a violation
of the law of nations.
As an alternative to jurisdiction under RCRA, FRT has a
valid cause of action under the ATCA. Having established he
suffered damages as a result of the tort committed by GRG and
Newtown PTA, FRT has representational standing through
Valdez.
Furthermore, the exportation of hazardous waste
without obtaining consent from Sud-Americano should be
considered a law of nations arising from a United States treaty,
and thus authorizing the valid application of ATCA to the case at
hand.
III. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, IF THIS COURT
DISMISSES FRT’S CLAIM AGAINST GRG AND
NEWTOWN PTA, THE EPA SHOULD STILL BE
ALLOWED TO CONTINUE LITIGATION.
Alternatively, if this court finds that FRT lacks standing, the
EPA, as the administrator agency, has the right to intervene in
this action, recommence the proceeding, or both.
The
intervention clause of RCRA’s citizen suit provision was meant to
enable United States agencies to enter a proceeding to prevent
issues of potential significance from being decided with limited
input from private litigants. Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336,
338-39 (1st Cir. 1978). While there is currently a split among
circuits as to whether Article III standing is necessary for an
intervenor, federal law establishes that the administrator may
intervene as a matter of right in any RCRA action. 42 U.S.C. §
6972(d) (2006). Compare S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Kelly,
747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (equating interest necessary to
intervene with interest necessary to confer standing), with United
States v. 39.36 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985)
(differentiating statutorily protected interest from interest which
must be greater than the interest sufficient for standing).
Should this court find the EPA’s intervention is not a matter
of right, RCRA violations are a judicially cognizable interest, so
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imperative to the agency, that the final disposition of the matter
could affect its ability to enforce its own regulations. The intent
of Congress was to afford the EPA broad discretion regarding the
enforcement of RCRA. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Further, the EPA has the
authority to bring the action independently before this court
because this is the manner in which the agency judicially enforces
RCRA violations.
IV. FINDING THAT CONTAINER #VS2078 WAS SOLID
WASTE, THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE
EXTENDED THIS CLASSIFICATION BEYOND ITS
EXPORTATION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.
As the lower court noted, determining whether a material is
hazardous is a two-step analysis. First, it must be determined
whether the material is solid waste; and second, whether the
material is hazardous under the EPA’s criteria. Although the
district court found the materials collected in container #VS2078
were solid waste while in the United States, the district court
incorrectly determined the materials ceased to be solid waste
when they cross international borders. Federal courts have
consistently held violators of RCRA, as amended by HSWA,
accountable for unpermitted solid waste exported to countries
without their consent. United States v. Asrar, No. 93-50610, 1995
WL 5796461 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1995); Amlon, 775 F.Supp. 668. The
legislative history of HSWA specifically shows Congress’ intent to
expand the scope of RCRA to include the unregulated export of
hazardous waste abroad.
A.

The materials in container #VS2078 were solid waste.

The district court properly found that the UEDs in container
#VS2078 became solid waste when the Newtown residents
discarded them. (Order 11). The district court also stated that
the UEDs not salvaged for reuse were recycled, possibly making
them solid waste. (Order 11). However, the district court’s
application of the federal regulation defining sold waste is
misguided. A solid waste is any “discarded material” that does
not fall under an EPA exemption. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(1) (2009).
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A material is “discarded” when it is: (a) “abandoned;” or (b)
“recycled.” Id. § 261.2(a)(2)(i). Materials are “abandoned” if they
are “disposed of.” Id. § 261.2(b). Materials are also solid waste if
they are “recycled,” or if they are accumulated or stored before
recycling. Id. § 261.2(c). “Recycled” materials that are used for
their original purpose are not solid waste, but materials that are
“recycled” by being “reclaimed” are solid waste. Id. § 261.2(c)(3).
Furthermore, a material is “reclaimed” if it is processed to recover
a usable product.” Id. § 261.1(c)(4).
As provided by 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b), when the Newtown
residents gave their UEDs to GRG and Newtown PTA, each
individual “disposal” of an electronic devise created a solid waste.
When some of the UEDs were “recycled” at Garcia’s facility, they
also fell under 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)’s definition of solid waste
because heavy metals and other materials were “reclaimed” from
about half of the UEDs. GRG and Newtown PTA accumulated
the UEDs disposed of by the Newtown residents before shipping
them to Garcia’s facility for recycling. (Order 5). Accordingly, as
in 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c), the UEDs collectively became solid waste
when they were “accumulated. . .before recycling.” Id. § 261.2(c).
Therefore, the UEDs in container #VS2078 became solid waste
when they were individually disposed of, collectively
accumulated, and recycled through reclamation.
B.

Container #VS2078 was classified as solid waste while in
the United States and retained its solid waste character
when exported abroad.

When failing to extend container #VS2078’s solid waste
classification past the borders of the United States, the lower
court incorrectly relied on the presumption that “. . . legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. . . .”
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 US 244, 248 (1991).
Contrary to the lower court’s interpretation, when “there has
been significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot
properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that absent
the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have
meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations
law.” Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
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1326 (2d. Cir. 1991). Additionally, the lower court should have
acknowledged the legislative intent of RCRA and the subsequent
enactment of HSWA, both of which indicate Congress’ intent to
apply the classification scheme of RCRA past the borders of the
United States.
The enactment of HSWA included an exportation provision
that made exportation of hazardous waste to non-consenting
foreign countries an illegal activity. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006). The
legislative history of HSWA’s amendment illustrates Congress’
intent for the statute to apply abroad. Such intent was embodied
when, Representative Mikulskis stated,
[O]ur country will have safeguards from the ill effects of
hazardous waste upon the passage of HSWA. We should take an
equally firm stand on the transportation of hazardous waste
bound for export to other countries. . . If I were the U.S.
Secretary of the State, I would want to be sure that no American
ally or trading partner is saddled with U.S. waste it doesn’t want
or does not have the capacity to handle in an environmentally
sound manner.

Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 674. (citing 129 Cong. Rec. 27691 (1984)).
Similarly, the Congressional Findings Report delineated
Congress’ intent on this matter. The report noted, “alternatives
to existing methods of land disposal must be developed since
many of the cities in the United States will be running out of
suitable solid disposal sites within five years unless immediate
action is taken.” 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(8). The plaintiffs in Amlon
argued that Congress believed applying RCRA extraterritorially
would alleviate international fears about United States solid
waste exports. Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 676. Therefore, HSWA
was intended to foster mutually beneficial and necessary foreign
relations. Dismissing FRT’s claim on grounds that transferring
solid waste is permissible once it crosses international waters
would defeat the purpose of HSWA. Further, dismissal would
send a message to the international community that the United
States does not protect those who engage in their markets. Such
a reputation would seriously undermine and cripple the United
States’ ability to use necessary resources of international solid
waste disposal.
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While the case of Amlon initially indicates that RCRA is not
meant to apply extraterritorially, a closer examination of the case
reveals the Court was willing to extend the exportation provision
extraterritorially. Id. at 674. In fact, the court acknowledged that
extraterritorial application of HSWA specifically referred to the
exportation provision. Id. Likewise, the court in United States v.
Asrar exemplified the proper interpretation of RCRA when
analyzing exportation to non-consenting countries. Asrar, No. 9350610, 1995 WL 5796461. The defendant in Asrar was found
criminally liable “. . . for illegally transporting and exporting
hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928” because he not
only failed to obtain consent from the receiving country, but also
because the country lacked a necessary permit for receiving
hazardous waste. Id. at *2. GRG and Newtown PTA’s practices
with Pacifica parallel the actions of the defendant in Asrar. SudAmericano, like Pakistan, is an unregulated country with no
regulatory recycling regime. Furthermore, GRG and Newtown
PTA are similar to Asrar because they both ignored RCRA’s
requirements and exported hazardous material to another
country without first obtaining that country’s consent. Therefore,
this court should find that the exportation provision of RCRA
should be extended extraterritorially.
GRG and Newtown PTA should be held liable for violating 42
U.S.C. § 6901 for two reasons. First, GRG and Newtown PTA
failed to obtain consent from Sud-Americano prior to exporting
hazardous solid waste. Second, the purpose of HSWA is to
regulate the exportation of hazardous waste by prescribing
requirements, such as gaining the consent of the recipient
country. GRG and Newtown PTA violated those requirements.
Considering the lower court’s characterization of container
#VS2078 as solid waste, the legislative intent supporting the
enactment of HSWA, and the case precedent pertaining to
RCRA’s exportation provision, the lower court should have found
that RCRA provided jurisdiction to FRT.
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V. FOR THE PURPOSES OF RCRA, THE MATERIALS
EXPORTED IN CONTAINER #VS2078 WERE
HAZARDOUS; THEREFORE, GRG AND NEWTOWN
PTA SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATING
THE TESTING AND REPORTING PROVISIONS OF
RCRA’S HAZARDOUS WASTE SECTIONS.
This court should find the district court made four errors of
law. First, the district court should have concluded that the
materials in container #VS2078 were hazardous because the
primary contents of the container, “MyPhones,” routinely fail the
toxicity test for hazardous waste. Second, the district court
should have determined that GRG and Newtown PTA were
“generators” of hazardous waste. Third, the court should have
found that the “household waste” exemption did not apply to the
materials collected by GRG and Newtown PTA. Finally, even if
the “household waste” exemption applies, the district court erred
in concluding the mixture of household materials with nonhousehold UEDs was hazardous waste. Because GRG and
Newtown PTA are “generators” of solid waste, they were
obligated to determine whether the materials they collected were
hazardous waste under RCRA.
“MyPhones” contain toxic
substances, such as mercury and lead, which qualify as
“characteristic” hazardous waste under RCRA provisions.
However, GRG and Newtown PTA did not test the materials they
collected for toxicity or abide by the regulations governing
exportation of hazardous waste. Therefore, GRG and Newtown
PTA should be found liable for violating RCRA.
A. “MyPhones” qualify as “characteristic” hazardous waste.
The district court erred in concluding the materials in
container #VS2078 were characteristically toxic, and therefore
hazardous. A solid waste is a hazardous waste if it either: (1) it
exhibits an identified characteristic of hazardous waste or (2) is
specifically listed as hazardous. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a), (c)-(d). A
solid waste is characteristically hazardous if it is toxic. Id. §
261.24. Solid waste exhibits characteristics of toxicity if, using a
test called the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure
(hereinafter “TCLP”), the waste exceeds regulatory levels of
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identified substances, such as mercury and lead. Id. UEDs, such
as “MyPhones,” are not listed as hazardous under § 261.3(d).
Therefore, in order to be hazardous, the contents of container
#VS2078 must exhibit a characteristic of hazardous waste
identified under § 261.3(c).
GRG and Newtown PTA neglected to test the materials they
collected for toxicity, and significantly, the materials in container
#VS2078 are no longer available for testing. (Order 12). UEDs,
such as “MyPhones,” have been found to routinely fail the TCLP;
however, the district court dismissed this pertinent fact, claiming
it to be “only circumstantial evidence.” (Order 12). Nevertheless,
courts have generally recognized that circumstantial evidence has
equal weight with direct evidence. See United States v. Brown,
102 F.3d 1390, 1399 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. de la CruzPaulino, 61 F.3d 986, 999 (1st Cir. 19950) (courts in general have
recognized that circumstantial evidence may, in given settings,
have equal if not greater weight than direct evidence). In the
present case, there are no facts in the Order that indicate the
“MyPhones” in container #VS2078 were substantially different
than “MyPhones” that have failed the toxicity test. Accordingly,
the district court should have inferred that the “MyPhones” in
container #VS2078 contained the same material as every other
toxic “MyPhone.” Because GRG and Newtown PTA moved for
summary judgment, the district court was required to draw all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to FRT. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986).
Therefore, circumstantial evidence that “MyPhones” routinely fail
the TCLP prove that the “MyPhones” in container #VS2078 were
characteristically toxic, and therefore, hazardous.
B. GRG and Newtown PTA should be treated as “generators”
of hazardous waste.
The district court found the UEDs in container #VS2078
became solid waste when the Newtown residents gave them to
GRG and Newtown PTA, thus implying that the residents
“generated” the solid waste. (Order 11). However, the district
court neglected to find that GRG and Newtown PTA also
generated solid waste by accumulating the discarded UEDs
before shipping them overseas to be recycled. A “generator” is
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any person whose act or process produces hazardous waste, or
whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to
regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (2009).
The facts of this case indicate that two waste streams were
generated. When Newtown’s residents turned over their UEDs
individually to GRG and Newtown PTA a waste stream existed.
One resident’s act of discarding his or her UED created a waste
stream unique to that individual, separate and distinct from
every other resident’s disposal of UEDs. Stated differently, each
time an individual discarded a UED, he or she generated his or
her own stream of waste. GRG and Newtown PTA collected the
waste. (Order 5). Had the discarded UEDs not gone anywhere,
FRT’s discussion would end. However, GRG and Newtown PTA’s
act of accumulating the waste before shipping it for recycling
generated a new stream of waste. Accordingly, the district court
failed to distinguish the individual acts of discarding the UEDs
from GRG and Newtown PTA’s accumulation of solid waste before
recycling.
Therefore, because much of the solid waste
accumulated by GRG and Newtown PTA was characteristically
toxic, GRG and Newtown PTA generated hazardous waste.
Moreover, the EPA has brought enforcement actions against
parties similar to GRG and Newtown PTA. For example, In re
EarthEcycle was a case about a company who partnered with a
local organization to conduct a free electronic waste collection
event. In the Matter of EarthEcycle, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ2009-0001 (2009).
At this event, the respondent company
accumulated various electronic waste and subsequently shipped
them to Hong Kong to be recycled. Id. at 6. Although the
respondent merely collected the UEDs from local residents, the
EPA nonetheless determined that it was a generator of hazardous
waste. Id. at 7.
Similarly, the EPA determined that GRG and Newtown PTA
are generators of hazardous waste, and the district court should
have given deference to the EPA’s position regarding who
qualifies as a generator of solid waste. (Order 12). Referring to In
re EarthEcycle, the district court stated: “EPA’s other
enforcement action, of course, is not before this court and EPA’s
position there, and here, are just litigation positions, not entitled
to much, if any, deference.” (Order 12).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/13
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In Chevron, the Supreme Court created a two-part test that
defined the scope of judicial review of an agency’s construction of
the statute it administers. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. First, a
reviewing court must determine whether, “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. If so, “that is the end
of the matter.” Id. But if, “the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue,” the court moves to the second step
and must determine, “whether the agency’s [interpretation] is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
The second step of the analysis centers on whether the agency’s
interpretation of the relevant statutory provision is “reasonable.”
Id. at 845. Furthermore, the Court in Chevron recognized that,
“considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.” Id. at 844.
Upon review of the EPA’s actions in EarthEcycle and in the
present case, the district court should have applied the two-part
test in Chevron to determine if the EPA exceeded the scope of its
authority. See In re EarthEcycle, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ2009-001; Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. RCRA empowers the EPA to
regulate hazardous waste generators, transporters, and the
owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(c) (2006). Also, RCRA
requires the EPA to establish standards applicable to generators
of hazardous waste. Id. § 6922. Accordingly, RCRA is silent as to
the definition of a generator because it grants authority to the
EPA to promulgate regulations setting forth the standards. The
district court should have applied step two of the Chevron test to
determine whether the EPA was reasonable when it determined
that GRG and Newtown PTA were generators. Chevron, 467 US
at 843. RCRA’s delegation of broad authority to the EPA to
promulgate regulations applicable to generators demonstrates
that Congress intended that the EPA utilize its knowledge and
expertise to set the standards for generators of solid waste.
Although the EarthEcycle respondent and GRG and Newtown
PTA did not directly produce solid waste, attaching generator
status to their actions is not unreasonable given the wide scope of
the EPA’s authority.
Thus, because the EPA’s finding is
reasonable, GRG and Newtown PTA are generators.
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As generators of hazardous waste, GRG and Newtown PTA
are liable for violating RCRA’s testing and reporting
requirements. Federal regulations require waste generators to
determine whether their waste is hazardous, manage waste in
proper containers, label and date containers, inspect waste
storage areas, train employees, and plan for emergencies. 40
C.F.R. § 262 (2009). Additionally, exportation of hazardous waste
is prohibited without: (1) notification to the EPA of intent to
export; (2) consent of the receiving country; (3) a copy of the EPA
“Acknowledgment of Consent” attached to the manifest; and (4)
the shipment conforming with the terms of the receiving country.
Id. § 262.52. GRG and Newtown PTA, as generators of hazardous
waste, failed to carry out all of the above the requirements.
Therefore, GRG and Newtown PTA are liable under RCRA and
the materials in container #VS2078 should be deemed hazardous.
C. The “Household Exemption” did not remove the materials
in container #VS2078 from the RCRA regulatory scheme.
The materials in container #VS2078 do not qualify as
household waste under the RCRA exemption, and are therefore
still hazardous. Federal regulations provide that solid household
waste, “including household waste that has been collected,
transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered. . .or reused,” is
not hazardous. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (2009). “Household waste” is
defined as: “any material (including garbage, trash and sanitary
waste in septic tanks) derived from households.” Id. The district
court found that GRG and Newtown PTA were careful to accept
only UEDs that were derived from households, and thus, the
UEDs fell under the household waste exemption from hazardous
waste. (Order 12).
However, the lower court prematurely established that all of
the UEDs GRG and Newtown PTA received at the collection
event were derived from households. The district court reached
its conclusion merely because donors signed a form that stated
the UEDs were used in the home. (Order 5). The forms signed by
the donors, however, do not conclusively establish the UEDs were
actually derived from households. Signing the form was merely a
perfunctory requirement and there was virtually no incentive for
donors to be truthful about where their UEDs were used.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/13
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Moreover, one of Ventura’s photographs shows three laptops that
were stamped with the label “Property of the Unites States
Government,” and had barcodes which indicated that the laptops
were used at the EPA office in New Union. (Order 13). It follows
that GRG and Newtown PTA’s form did not prevent some donors
from giving away non-household UEDs.
Furthermore, based on the legislative history of RCRA, the
EPA applies two criteria to define the scope of the household
exclusion: “First, the waste must be generated by individuals on
the premises of a temporary or permanent residence for
individuals; that is, a household. Second, the waste stream must
be composed primarily of materials found in the waste generated
by consumers in their homes.” Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Sys.;
Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 49 FR 44978 (EPA
Nov. 13, 1984) (rules and regulations). However, waste from
retail stores, office buildings, restaurants, etc., are not exempt
because they do not serve as temporary or permanent residences
for individuals, and the waste generated at these establishments
are not necessarily similar to waste generated by consumers in
their homes. Id. The household exclusion is based on a Senate
Report that states: “[t]he hazardous waste program is not to be
used to control the disposal of substances used in households or to
extend control over general municipal waste based on the
presence of such substances. S. REP. No. 94-988, at 16 (1976).
Although households sometimes generate material that could fall
under the hazardous waste definition, Congress recognized that it
would be impossible to regulate waste from every household. Id.
In the present case, the solid waste at issues does not meet
the EPA’s two criteria for the household exemption, and thus
should be considered hazardous waste. First, the waste was not
generated on the premises of a residence for individuals when
GRG and Newtown PTA accumulated it for recycling. Although
some of the UEDs likely came from households, they were not
“discarded” until Newtown residents gave them away at the
Newtown High School parking lot. Unlike the general municipal
waste that Congress referred to, GRG and Newtown PTA solicited
a specific type of material, inspected each item, and thus, had
constant control over the type of waste they accumulated. (Order
5). Congress did not intend to protect such activities from
hazardous waste regulation under the household exemption.
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Second, the waste accumulated by GRG and Newtown PTA was
not the type of waste generated by consumers in their home. A
typical consumer does not dispose of an entire shipping container
filled with used electronics. Accordingly, the household waste
exemption does not apply to UEDs that GRG and Newtown PTA
accumulated.
D. Even if the household waste exemption applies, GRG and
Newtown PTA generated hazardous waste because UEDs
derived from households were mixed with hazardous nonhousehold materials.
The district court should have found that the household
materials in container #VS2078 were mixed with non-household
hazardous waste. Finding that there was not sufficient evidence,
the lower court concluded that the three EPA laptops did not
come from a household. (Order 13). The lower court added that
even if the laptops came directly from the EPA, the precautions
taken by GRG and Newtown PTA to confine the UEDs collected
to household material precluded the three laptops from changing
the character of the whole container to non-household waste.
(Order at 13). However, the district court erroneously neglected
to analyze the regulation pertaining to mixtures of characteristic
hazardous waste and non-hazardous waste.
A mixture of a characteristic hazardous waste and any other
waste will be considered hazardous if the resultant mixture
exhibits a hazardous waste characteristic. 40 C.F.R. §
261.3(a)(2)(i). Laptop computers consistently fail the TCLP for
determining characteristic hazardous waste. TIMOTHY G.
TIMOTHY ET AL., RCRA TOXICITY CHARCTERIZATION OF
CPUs AND OTHER DISCARDED ELECTRONIC DEVICES
(2004), available at http://www.ees.ufl.edu/homepp/townsend/
Research/ElectronicLeaching/UF%20EWaste%20TC%20Report%
20July%2004%20v1.pdf. Thus, this court should reasonably infer
that the EPA laptops exhibited characteristics of toxicity and
were thus, hazardous. Unlike the district court’s finding, the
mixture rule under 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 does not allow consideration
of whether the “character” of the mixed waste has changed. 40
C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(i). The mixture of UEDs from households
and the EPA laptops would fail the TCLP for characteristic

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/13

32

APPELLANTS_FINAL

2010]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLANTS

969

hazardous waste.
Accordingly, this court should hold the
materials in container #VS2078 were hazardous waste.
Furthermore, because courts must evaluate all the facts in a
light most favorable to FRT, the district court improperly found
there was not enough evidence to conclude the EPA laptops did
not come directly from a household. Even if a Newtown resident
brought an EPA laptop from his or her home, the laptop was
derived from a government office building and not generated by
the household. Thus, the EPA laptops were not generated by a
household and are not exempted from hazardous waste
regulation.
Therefore, this court should find that the material in
container #VS2078 and in particular, the “MyPhones”, are
hazardous waste, that GRG and Newtown PTA are not classified
as generators of hazardous waste, and the household exemption
does not apply to the materials in container #VS2078. Even if the
household exemption did apply, however, this court should
conclude that the mixture of non-hazardous household waste and
toxic non-household UEDs were hazardous.
CONCLUSION
This court should find that FRT has representational
standing, through either or both members Ventura or Valdez to
bring this claim. All article III requisite elements, injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressibility have been satisfied. Specifically,
Ventura and Valdez’s injuries would not exist but for GRG and
Newtown PTA exporting hazardous waste to Sud-Americano
without gaining the countries proper consent. Redressing their
injuries through civil penalties and injunctive relief would deter
similar conduct in the future. Furthermore, this court has
jurisdiction to hear this claim. First, Ventura can bring a
citizen’s suit under RCRA for GRG and Newtown PTA’s direct
violation. Specifically, the material in container #VS2078 was
both solid and hazardous in nature, as it did not fall under the
household waste exemption of RCRA. Second, in the alternative
of jurisdiction under RCRA, FRT establishes jurisdiction through
Valdez under the ATCA because the injuries he suffered are a
direct result of a tort committed in violation of the law of nations.
Should, however, this court determine that FRT can not establish
standing, the EPA can properly continue on in the litigation.
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